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This paper examines how open-seat presidential elections, in which the incumbent cannot seek re-election, relate to IPO pricing in Taiwan from 2000 to 2023. Taiwan’s fixed four-year presidential terms and two-term limit make both the timing of elections and the absence of the incumbent predictable, allowing us to distinguish elections in which a change in leadership is certain from those in which the incumbent runs for re-election. We find that IPO underpricing is higher and offer-price valuations relative to comparable firms are lower in the year before open-seat elections, but not before elections in which the incumbent runs. The differences do not vary with the expected closeness of the race and arise mainly when the offer price is set. The valuation differences are concentrated among small and medium-sized firms listed on the Taipei Exchange. These findings suggest that the loss of an incumbent policy benchmark, rather than uncertainty about the winner, is associated with less favourable IPO pricing.
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Wang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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