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The crime against humanity of persecution presents a distinctive evidentiary problem: the prosecution must establish not only conduct involving a sufficiently serious deprivation of fundamental rights, but also its discriminatory character and the accused person's requisite discriminatory intent. These elements create a difficult relationship between contextual evidence, collective patterns of victimization, and proof of individual culpability. International criminal jurisprudence permits discriminatory intent to be inferred from objective circumstances and the accused's conduct considered as a whole. Nevertheless, contextual discrimination cannot automatically establish the subjective element attributable to a particular accused. This article examines the legal and evidentiary boundaries of that inference. Through a doctrinal analysis of Article 7(1)(h) and Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and relevant decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court, it identifies the principal distinction between evidence establishing a discriminatory environment and evidence connecting an individual accused to the discriminatory purpose required for persecution. Particular attention is given to the relationship between the underlying persecutory act, the identity of the targeted group, the gravity of the deprivation, the discriminatory purpose, and the accused's knowledge of the broader attack. The article proposes an act-specific and person-specific method of evidentiary assessment. It does not introduce a new legal element or claim empirical validation. Rather, it organizes existing legal requirements into a structured sequence designed to prevent contextual evidence from substituting for proof of individual intent. The central conclusion is that patterns of discriminatory conduct may provide powerful circumstantial evidence, but a conviction for persecution requires a reasoned demonstration of the connection between those patterns, the particular conduct charged, and the mental element attributable to the accused.
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Pommier Gallo, PhD., Sergio (2026) studied this question.
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