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For years, observers have predicted that Russia cannot afford the war in Ukraine; meanwhile the war continues as costs mount with no end in sight. This article analyzes how Russia has managed to fund its wartime economy over the first four plus years through a mix of fiscal and quasi-fiscal mechanisms. Widespread tax hikes, high domestic borrowing, and massive sovereign wealth fund withdrawals have supported its soaring military spending, along with the creative use of off-budget tools, like preferential lending and shifts to loss-making state enterprises. Although these measures have stabilized Russia’s wartime economy in the short term and have failed to deter its ambitions in Ukraine, they nonetheless carry risks for Russia’s future economic growth and regime stability. Unless the high price of oil related to the Iran war endures, Russia will continue to face enormous budgetary pressure and will likely experience long-term socio-economic repercussions given its wartime fiscal imbalances.
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Appel et al. (2026) studied this question.
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