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Several Member States have recently introduced or are planning to introduce New Competition Tools (NCTs), also resurrecting the question of an NCT on the EU level. This article analyses similarities and differences between these national NCTs, which attempt to balance the necessary degree of abstraction of the intervention criteria with the need for legal certainty. An excessively high degree of abstraction of the intervention criteria can be addressed by carving out of the NCT more specific harmful conduct that can be prohibited without recourse to an NCT, either by prohibiting specified conduct ex lege or by giving competition authorities the power to prohibit ex nunc certain conduct in a specific case. NCTs can be made more predictable by structuring them according to typical theories of harm. National experimentation with NCTs is not yet sufficiently mature to harmonize NCTs on the European level. Eventually an NCT on the European level will be advantageous, but national NCTs should not be preempted. Ensuring the independent enforcement of national NCTs is a precommitment device against external attempts to influence competition law enforcement by threatening trade law retaliation. A European NCT also raises the old question of an independent European competition authority.
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Florian Wagner–von Papp (2026) studied this question.
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