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We examine how end-to-end (E2E) encryption and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) differently reshape the ‘institutional privacy dilemma’, namely, the persistent tension in the public institutional protection of privacy because the government actors responsible for protecting it are also incentivised to undermine it. We conceptualise privacy as a polycentric institutional arrangement structured by interactions among governments, firms, and individuals under conditions of asymmetric information, costly verification, and incomplete contracting. The equilibrium level of privacy is especially sensitive to technological change because such change alters the production, availability, and use of verifiable signals on which privacy protection and enforcement inversely depend. Using the United States as an illustrative case, we argue that E2E encryption intensifies the dilemma by suppressing observable signals, thereby constraining governments’ legibility and enforcement objectives while inducing second-best adaptations to recover informational access. ZKPs, by contrast, enable selective verification without full disclosure, allowing enforcement to proceed in bounded contexts where compliance can be formalised through specific cryptographic proofs. Even then, ZKPs do not fully resolve the dilemma, since they leave broader legibility demands and adaptive constraints intact. Ultimately, privacy-enhancing technologies reconfigure the institutional conditions under which privacy protection and erosion unfold.
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Alston et al. (2026) studied this question.
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