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Biased electoral institutions can privilege one party over others. Yet parties frequently abstain from making reforms. What explains their forbearance? We elaborate a formal model where citizens anticipate that parties are likely to implement opportunistic reforms that benefit the reforming party, and they accordingly punish parties for any reform. This stable equilibrium, without electoral reforms, applies when existing institutions are of sufficiently high quality and at middling levels of potential party bias. We further expect that coalitions of distinct parties have less potential bias, and their reforms are thus less likely to be punished electorally. We evaluate the model using real proposals for electoral reform embedded in a survey experiment in Germany. In line with the model, citizens become less supportive of the opposition and its proposed reform, when they are informed which party is associated with the reform. By contrast, we find no effects for the governing coalition’s proposal, suggesting that citizens are less likely to punish coalitions for reforms. We substantiate the coalition predictions using cross-national evidence that shows that electoral reforms decrease government vote-shares only for non-coalition governments. The model helps explain the endurance of electoral institutions: if existing institutions are of sufficiently high quality, any reform is punished, and even unbiased reforms are unattractive.
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Haffert et al. (2026) studied this question.
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