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Debates about normativity have long shaped sociological self-understanding, often crystallizing into oppositions between value-free science and ethically engaged critique. This article argues this binary framing obscures a more fundamental issue: not whether sociology is normative, but how normativity is handled within sociological practice. We introduce normative reflexivity as a disciplinary virtue, understood as the capacity and willingness to recognize, articulate, justify, and revise the value assumptions that shape sociological inquiry. Drawing on Michael Burawoy’s fourfold typology of professional, policy, critical, and public sociology, we show that each variety institutionalizes a distinctive configuration of epistemic and ethical values, and integrates normativity into different levels and stages of the research process. When cultivated, normative reflexivity supports transparency, accountability, and pluralistic engagement; when absent, each sociological type tends toward characteristic pathological forms. We contend that much that ails contemporary sociology can be chalked up to a failure to institutionalize this vital virtue.
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Watts et al. (2026) studied this question.
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