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: Gaza Facing a Test That Goes Beyond the Competition for Power The Palestinian scene in the Gaza Strip can no longer be understood through the traditional binary of conflict between Hamas and Fatah, or through the familiar question of which party will administer the Strip after the war. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 has moved the issue into a new political and institutional context, extending beyond the consolidation of a ceasefire to transitional arrangements involving governance, humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction, within an environment shaped by overlapping Palestinian, international, regional, and security roles. The most consequential transformation, however, does not lie in the establishment of new administrative arrangements in itself. Rather, it lies in the test this transformation imposes on Palestinian political forces: Can they move beyond competing for positions of influence and representation and participate in building a national framework that responds to Gaza’s needs, protects its society, and reconnects its institutions to the broader Palestinian political entity? The outlines of this test have begun to emerge even before the administrative transition has been fully implemented on the ground. The monitoring conducted through the D-Series research platform, within the HHW-SOV-2803-2026 framework, has identified different patterns in the positioning of Hamas and Fatah. While Hamas has tended to reduce its overt political and organizational visibility and to present the existing administrative system as non-partisan, Fatah has sought to highlight its organizational, popular, and social presence, reactivating its cadres, networks, and structures across the Strip. Yet the analysis of these patterns should not stop at identifying which side is more visible or better able to demonstrate its influence. The deeper question is: What do these forces seek from the coming phase? Can Gaza’s interests take precedence over their organizational calculations? And can the arrangements under Resolution 2803 become an entry point for building national governance that is not defined by factional identity, but is grounded in Palestinian national legitimacy and operates within a supportive Arab strategic environment? Gaza faces two interconnected challenges: the challenge of the present, in which people's needs must take precedence over political competition; and the challenge of the future, which requires moving from a system in which public functions overlap with factional identity toward national governance that protects institutional independence while accommodating political pluralism.
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hassan walli (2026) studied this question.
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