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Type of the article: Research ArticleAbstractA hedge insures price, not the delivery a catastrophe disables; hedged-flow discount rates omit that risk. The purpose of the study is to calibrate the operational catastrophe premium of ring-fenced hedged commodity cash flows ex ante from published hazards and to compare it with post-event credit repricing, bounded for attenuation. A registry of 83 catastrophes, 1966–2023, supports both routes. Differenced reactions were 347 basis points for BP (Macondo), 69 for Vale (Brumadinho) and 77 for Massey (Upper Big Branch). Both attributed rating actions fell on the two largest losses; ring-fenced Samarco defaulted, losing about 65 per cent of face. A structural mapping shows the parent reaction attenuated and convex in loss; Equation (2) holds in direction and order of magnitude, not in level. A post-event stress-calibration surface of eleven cells of heterogeneous evidential strength (two measured, one reconstructed, one structural, seven analog) spans 50-340 basis points. Physical expected loss is 0.4-28 basis points a year across classes. At the catastrophe-bond multiple of 2.3, the floor of the ex ante calibration range falls short of the stress surface in every testable class; credit-market ceilings reach the parent-level value for coal and, against the observed Brumadinho reading or at Brazilian rates, upstream dams; not offshore. Catastrophe exposure must enter valuation consistently: under the contracted-cash-flow convention adopted here, the premium – expected loss and priced component – is carried in the discount rate as a calibration range, and the stress surface serves stress tests.
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Бур’янов et al. (2026) studied this question.
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