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Research on shareholder activism has focused largely on the direct, dyadic relationship between activists and the firms they target, leaving open a broader question: When does activism actually change corporate behavior? We argue that the answer depends on the wider system of stakeholders surrounding the firm. Integrating stakeholder influence research with institutional theory, we theorize that shareholder demands more effectively motivate organizational change when other actors in the institutional environment reinforce the issues those demands raise. We test this in the context of environmental and social (E&S) shareholder proposals, asking whether they reduce firms’ stakeholder violations, which are regulator-sanctioned acts of misconduct that can harm non-shareholding stakeholders. Using data on E&S proposals at 428 U.S. firms from 2007 to 2021 , we find that proposals reduce stakeholder violations, and that this effect operates through managerial receptivity, defined as a firm’s behavioral pattern of engaging rather than resisting activist demands. Critically, this relationship is amplified when firms face greater scrutiny from two institutional pillars: regulative pressure from regulators and cultural-cognitive pressure from NGOs. By showing that non-shareholding stakeholders condition whether shareholder activism translates into reduced corporate harm, we move beyond the activist–firm dyad and offer a systems-level account of when, and through what mechanisms, shareholder activism succeeds in achieving its aims.
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DesJardine et al. (2026) studied this question.
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