Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Global environmental public goods faces a persistent funding gap compared to highly localized sustainability initiatives. This paper resolves this discrepancy by embedding social distance into a multi-good impure altruism model within an aggregative game framework. I prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, demonstrating a theoretical ‘proximity paradox’. As the beneficiary population for global goods grows vast, pure altruistic incentives are crowded out via a drop-in-the-bucket effect. As a result, optimal donation decisions are dominated by warm-glow motives, favoring socially proximate local causes. Comparative statics demonstrate that this local warm-glow dominance blunts standard price interventions, such as matching grants. To illustrate the model’s applied microeconomic implications, I examine two institutional contexts in Japan. First, I analyse the proliferation of local ‘rain gardens’ in Suginami Ward, where visible community reciprocity artificially maximizes local warm-glow. Second, I examine the Furusato Nozei (hometown tax) system, which severely distorts spatial resource allocation via outsized private return gifts, diverting 47.9% of generated capital into procurement and administrative costs. My results highlight the economic substitutability between global mitigation and local adaptation, emphasizing the need for institutional mechanism designs – such as municipal resilience bonds – that deliberately bundle macro-level environmental mandates with localized warm-glow.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Kentaka Aruga (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: