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This study revisits the implications of CEO outside directorships for CEO compensation and firm performance by quasi-replicating and extending the findings of Geletkanycz et al. (2001) and Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011). We examine their hypotheses, originally tested with data from 1987, using a cross-sectional sample of Fortune 1000 firms in 2019 and panel data from 2010 to 2019. Our findings suggest that most relationships observed in the original studies may not hold in contemporary contexts. For CEO compensation, we find a positive association in the direct replication but not the extension replication. Diversification negatively moderates this association only in the extension, reversing the original result. For firm performance, we find no significant main effect in either analysis. The direct replication reveals a positive association under high industry concentration, opposite to the original finding under low concentration, while the extension does not reproduce the original moderating findings.
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Li et al. (2026) studied this question.
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