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Rather than producing horizontally integrated architectures that are envisioned in the platform governance literature, the urban governance platforms in China generate multi-layered arrangements across the various governmental levels. We address this gap by shifting attention from platform adoption to the interactions between the higher-level rule-makers and lower-level rule-takers during operations. Drawing on a case study of Xihu District, Hangzhou, China, we identify a governance model in which higher-level governments use platforms to integrate information and enforce accountability, while the lower-level governments build parallel platforms that are able to absorb complaints, manage pressure, and preserve autonomy. This interaction produces an institutionalized equilibrium that sustains multi-layered platform governance. The model simultaneously enhances government responsiveness to the citizens and coordination across departments and levels, while consuming administrative resources and shifting the burdens downward. By showing that platforms are being reconfigured by the bureaucratic institutions rather than replacing them, this study clarifies how technology and bureaucracy co-constitute urban governance.
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Gao et al. (2026) studied this question.
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