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The relation between the ground of knowing (ratio cognoscendi) and the ground of being (ratio essendi) generates a classical paradox: if they coincide, inquiry seems to possess beforehand the truth it seeks; if they differ, it becomes hard to explain how thought reaches reality. This article aims to offer a Cognitive Psychiatry interpretation of this paradox, as discussed in Michel Meyer's critique of ontology, by distinguishing co-praxization, con-causation, analogization and conceptual knowledge. It is a theoretical essay supported by a narrative review of literature from 2021 to 2026, articulated with Meno's paradox, Piaget's assimilation and accommodation, causal epistemology and Spinoza's monism. The central proposal is that the participation of the central nervous system in the processualities of the world precedes their conceptualization. Co-praxization is not discursive knowledge and does not necessarily produce con-causation. Con-causation occurs when the biologically prepared nervous system incorporates causal organizations that allow anticipation, extrapolation and analogy. Automatic associations open causal, temporal and co-processual gaps, provisionally filled by hypotheses drawn from causalities already assimilated. Problematicity emerges when conceptual reconstruction must clarify these gaps. Error frequently results from applying a causal analogy to a processuality with which it does not correspond, and corroboration allows this correspondence to be revised. The paradox of prior knowledge can be reinterpreted as a confusion among processual participation, causal assimilation and conceptual knowledge. Con-causation offers a hypothesis for the continuity between cosmic causality and cerebral-cognitive organization, close to a processual monism.
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Rodrigues et al. (2026) studied this question.
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