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Major economies are increasingly protecting their domestic clean-technology industries from one another. We ask what happens if this protection becomes reciprocal and escalates. Using regulatory, fiscal, or trade policies to protect and promote the interests of national industries against external competition may increase the cost of transformation and delay the diffusion of key low-carbon technologies. But how large are these effects? And do these measures actually help to achieve the objective of strengthening domestic industrial competitiveness and resilience of domestic industries? Employing a macroeconomic model, we assess scenarios with varying stringency of protectionism in which the five leading industrial economies symmetrically impose import tariffs on clean energy technologies and their upstream value chains and recycle the revenues into subsidies for domestic producers. We find that this reciprocal tariff escalation may double the mitigation cost for some regions in the most stringent case. Its environmental effects are small as reduced economic growth compensates for less efficient climate action. We also show that protective tariffs are hardly effective where major economies deploy them symmetrically. Only under the most stringent assumptions can we observe some limited success in boosting domestic competitiveness of green industries. Our analysis provides a first quantification of the economic and environmental costs of the geoeconomic turn in decarbonisation. Going beyond the modelled effects, we discuss the risk that sharply rising transition costs erode domestic support for climate policy and international cooperation, and we underline the need for collaborative governance to contain escalating geoeconomic rivalry.
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Hermwille et al. (2026) studied this question.
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