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Politically connected directors in emerging market firms are largely assumed to serve a political function by providing political resources and regulatory advantage, but their effectiveness remains inconclusive. Our study draws on signaling theory to propose an alternative social function of the presence of politician directors. We theorize that the presence of politicians on boards of emerging‐market firms is associated with higher ESG ratings, which in turn result in higher firm value. Using 688 firm‐year observations in a sample of 234 Philippine publicly listed corporations for the period 2021–2024, we provide empirical evidence showing that ESG ratings fully mediate the positive relationship between the presence of politician directors and firm value. We also find that ownership structure moderates the link between politically connected directors and ESG ratings, where the signaling value is more pronounced in business group‐affiliated firms and those with dispersed ownership. Our research has important implications for the firms' political connections as a strategic tool for social signaling purposes to constantly communicate to stakeholders such as investors, rating agencies, regulators, and the general public about their orientation toward broader societal concerns beyond shareholder value.
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Federo et al. (2026) studied this question.
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