Abstract. This paper investigates the divergent national strategies for achieving "digital sovereignty" among four major geopolitical actors: the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia. It argues that digital sovereignty has evolved from a defensive concept focused on network security into a comprehensive geopolitical strategy for projecting power, values, and economic influence (Süsslin, 2025; Metakides, 2025). Through a comparative analysis of key policy and legal frameworks—including the US National Cybersecurity Strategy (2023), the EU's GDPR/DSA/DMA package, China's Cybersecurity Law (CSL), and Russia's "Sovereign Internet" laws—the paper identifies three distinct models of digital sovereignty: the US market-driven, rebalanced-responsibility model; the EU's regulation-as-power, normative model; and the Sino-Russian state-centric, control-oriented model (Metakides, 2025; Freedom House, n.d.). The analysis reveals that these approaches are creating a fragmented "splinternet," characterized by competing regulatory blocs, contested data governance regimes, and a securitized global technology supply chain (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025). The paper concludes by proposing a new framework that understands digital sovereignty not merely as a quest for autonomy but as a primary vector for exercising state power in a multipolar digital world order, with significant implications for global stability, international law, and the future of the internet..
Prokopyshyn et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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