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This analysis argues against cognitive agency and processing views, proposing a teleological account of understanding.
I offer an interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of cognitive spontaneity that explains how the understanding can function outside of the efficient-causal structure of nature, without being part of what McDowell calls ‘the domain of responsible freedom’. Contemporary literature is dominated by the ‘cognitive agency’ approach, which identifies cognitive spontaneity with a kind of freedom. Against this view, the ‘cognitive processing view’ banishes agential notions from its account but also reduces the understanding to mere mechanism. I argue that neither of these interpretations is obligatory, motivating a teleological but non-agential account that resists assimilation into either of the current approaches.
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Claudi Brink (2025) studied this question.
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