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I argue that Kant’s conception of natural ends is recursive and that its recursive character explains Kant’s claim in the third Critique that the idea of a natural end necessarily leads us to the idea of nature as a whole as a system of ends. To think about a natural end is simultaneously to think about the wider kind to which it belongs. But that kind also possesses the defining features of a natural end: it has the form of a system (in which the whole is prior to the parts) and its is unity grounded in a shared causal power. If each successive level is to be thought of as a natural end in turn, reflection is driven to view larger and larger portions of nature as systematically organized ends and, as a consequence, larger and larger portions of the mechanism of nature as subordinated to those ends.
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Thomas Marré (2026) studied this question.
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