Alignment of Nike's Directors Remuneration Structure with Shareholders Interests

This study investigates the alignment between Nike Inc.s board compensation structure and shareholder interests. Based on DEF 14A filings, annual reports, and relevant literature, the paper examines compensation composition, equity ownership policies, and long-term incentive plans. Findings show that while Nike uses restricted stock units (RSUs) and stockholding requirements to partially align interests, improvements are needed. Current incentives lack direct ties to strategic performance indicators such as innovation, ESG, and global expansion. Performance evaluations remain largely subjective, and stock ownership thresholds could be strengthened. Advanced governance mechanisms like clawback provisions and multi-dimensional performance hurdles are absent. The study proposes adopting performance stock units (PSUs), quantitative director evaluations, stricter stockholding policies, and benchmarking industry best practices to enhance governance transparency, risk management, and long-term strategic focus, contributing to sustained shareholder value.