This model reveals how dissenting opinions can influence majority decisions in collegial courts, indicating a complex interplay in judicial processes.
We study the incentives for writing dissenting opinions that try to shape the law. We model the interaction between a minority and majority in a collegial court setting. Dissenting judges calculate how much effort to put into a dissenting opinion with an expectation that their work can probabilistically affect how the law is applied in the future. That calculus can influence how a majority opinion author writes an opinion and the dynamics of collegial decision-making and coalition formation. We evaluate comparative statics about the content of opinions and the conditions under which dissenting opinions should emerge from collective choice. The results help rationalize both differences in dissenting behavior across levels of the judicial hierarchy and how separate opinion-writing shapes the extremity of judicial opinions.
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England et al. (2025) studied this question.
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