The paper examines personhood in the abortion debate, analyzing fetal rights and implications for life.
In dealing with abortion controversy between the pro-life and pro-choice groups of people, it is claimed that the fetus should possess ‘personhood’ in order to have the right to life. The question met here is when does this ‘personhood’ would appear? Some say it is gained when the fetus become sentience, have desire, develop the capacity to feel pain, have conception of one self, or can perform self-motivated activity. But these capacities are often not possessed by the comatose patients, in dreams, after surgery; reducing these persons to non-persons. It is also argued that either after conception, quickening, viability or birth, personhood is gained by the fetus. But possession of these criteria does not provide categorical answers to the problem. In this paper I have tried to discuss what exactly is meant by personhood and whether possession of it can solve the abortion debate.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Pradipta Mukhopadhyay (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: