August 25, 2025Open Access

A Case for Pay-as-Bid Auctions

Key Points

Pay-as-bid auctions present a unique mechanism that could reshape market bidding strategies, boosting competitive pricing.
The analysis emphasizes the economic principles underlying pay-as-bid auctions and their potential effectiveness in various markets.
Discussion focuses on the distinct benefits and drawbacks of this auction format compared to traditional models.
Findings may influence future auction designs and regulatory approaches in the realm of political economy.

Abstract

Previous articleNext article Open AccessA Case for Pay-as-Bid AuctionsMarek Pycia and Kyle WoodwardMarek Pycia and Kyle WoodwardPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookXLinkedInRedditBlueskyEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Just Accepted Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/738341 PermissionsRequest permissions HistoryAccepted July 09, 2025 © 2025 The University of Chicago. All Rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

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