Research on the Policy Network Efficiency of EU Defense Integration from the Perspective of the Principal-Agent Theory: A Case Analysis Based on the Peacekeeping Operations of the CFSP

This study applies the principal-agent theory in institutional economics to explore the mechanism of information symmetry and the incentive-constraint mechanism in shaping the effectiveness of the policy network, focusing on the implementation effectiveness of peacekeeping operations under the framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By selecting four typical peacekeeping cases, namely the EU's peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU's Border Assistance Mission in Libya, the EU's Military Training Mission in Mali and the capacity-building operation of Mali's internal affairs, and using methods such as decision-making text analysis, comparison of the voting behaviors and action participation degrees of member states, the theoretical inferences are systematically tested. The study finds that a high degree of information symmetry and an effective incentive-constraint system both enhance the collective action ability of member states and the policy implementation effect. When other variables are controlled to be consistent, the changes in these two mechanisms can separately explain the differences or changes in the dependent variable. This paper theoretically deepens the understanding of the internal coordination logic of the CFSP, and practically provides a reference for institutional design for the EU to improve the efficiency of future peacekeeping missions.