An analysis of the foundations and prospects of logical possibility realism based on the theories of D. Lewis and A. Karpenko

This paper examines the argument for a realist interpretation of the ontological status of logical possibility, drawing on the modal realism of D. Lewis and the hyperrealism of A. Karpenko. Both authors adopt a “best consequences” argumentation strategy, focusing on the positive effects of accepting realism about logical possibility. The paper demonstrates that D. Lewis’s modal realism is a productive metaphysical theory for the philosophical un­derstanding of modal concepts, but at the same time it is not without its internal difficulties and weaknesses. A number of weaknesses of the Lewisian approach are highlighted, mainly related either to some contradictions and gaps within his concept, or to the fact that accept­ing modal realism, as the article shows, creates more problems than it solves. A. Karpenko’s concept of hyperrealism is not without similar problems. However, it is interesting for its non-standard understanding of ontology, which is largely similar to medieval theories of transcendentals. From a philosophical point of view, the methodological principle formu­lated by Karpenko is also promising: the true limiter is the one that expands the boundaries of the real.