Criterion of Truth and Common Beliefs: Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians 1 (M 7)

Abstract “Do we need a criterion of truth to make ordinary claims like ‘the water in the bath is tepid’? Yes. Then the Pyrrhonians cannot consistently hold such claims, and inactivity threatens their skeptical philosophical undertaking.” When introducing the discussion of the criterion in M 7, Sextus presents certain beliefs about the existence and priority of the criterion of truth as commonly held – beliefs that could make the above line of reasoning seem natural and inescapable. Yet this opening serves to set up Sextus’ subsequent strategy, which not only rejects the Dogmatists’ arguments about the criterion of truth but also undermines a common way of thinking and speaking about it – a way based on an analogy with measuring instruments that had shaped the very preconception of the criterion. By targeting this preconception and this analogy, Sextus’ strategy weakens the persuasive force of the inactivity argument against the Skeptics and opens up a different perspective on ordinary truth claims and the investigation into the criterion of truth.