Pyrrhonist Preferences and Moral Action

This paper defends the Pyrrhonian skeptic against the objection that, because she lives entirely without belief ( adoxastōs ) in pursuit of psychic tranquility ( ataraxia ), she is unable or unlikely to act ethically, particularly in unjust sociopolitical contexts. This objection takes the form of three connected charges: (1) the skeptic lacks the moral psychological resources needed to deliberate and act as an ethical agent ought; (2) even if in principle she has these resources, she is likely to just perform whatever action causes the least psychic disturbance regardless of whether it is morally objectionable; and (3) in order to engage in decision-making procedures that would result in ethical action, she would need to hold some beliefs, thus rendering her adoxastōs Skeptic Way inconsistent. This paper refutes these charges by arguing that the Pyrrhonist is not wholly without moral psychological resources needed for acting ethically by illuminating the role that preferences and desires (i.e., “pro-attitudes”) play in her decision-making procedures and showing that these attitudes are distinct enough from belief to preserve her adoxastōs Skeptic Way, while also being stable and persistent enough to guide her actions in a way that is both reliable and predictable. I demonstrate that the kind of states of affairs the Pyrrhonist’s pro-attitudes are likely to be reliably directed toward are those that orient her toward morally praiseworthy actions and away from conformism in unjust sociopolitical contexts. Indeed, I argue she might even be more likely to act ethically in some sociopolitical contexts than her dogmatic peers, whether these be philosophical dogmatists or ordinary people. Consequently, I assert that the Pyrrhonist can be a robust – though certainly atypical – moral agent whose preferences and desires give us reason to be cautiously optimistic about viewing at least some elements of her philosophical way of life as morally praiseworthy.