Do Local Gender Quotas in Multilevel Democracies Improve the Electability of Women at Higher Tiers? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in North India

Do local gender quotas in multilevel democracies have “spillover effects” for the electability of women at higher tiers? Using a conjoint survey experiment in North India, we assess how exposure to village-level female leaders elected through a gender quota affects voter support for state-level female candidates. Based on prior literature, we develop a “multilevel learning” logic, whereby local gender quota exposure increases support for state-level female candidates when the quota-elected local female leader is effective or educated. However, we find no support for this hypothesis. Instead, exploratory results show that local gender quotas lower support for state-level female candidates amongst certain men. Specifically, these quotas lead traditionalist men to move from having no gender preference for state-level candidates to affirmatively preferring male candidates. Meanwhile, partially progressive men move from preferring state-level female candidates to having no gender preference when they are represented by a quota-elected local woman who is educated.