The Affection-Intellect Relation and the Semantic Unity Proposition in the Vygotskian Approach to Intellectual Disability

This paper problematizes the intellectual disability issue in Vygotsky’s scientific production in conjunction with two central issues that emerge from it: the unity of affect-intellect and the semantic system of consciousness. The systemic and interfunctional dimension permeates and marks Vygotsky’s production about intellectual disability when he argues that psychological functions are organized in systems that establish constant connections among themselves, and (con)form the personality based on a given social context. In the set of these propositions, Vygotsky places affect and its relation with the intellect as fundamental elements for understanding the human psyche in its specificities, such as those presented in schizophrenia, intellectual disability, etc. Our objective is to revisit Vygotsky’s work, discussing: the notion of system and the relations between intellect-affect and his proposition of semantic unity of consciousness - catalyzed by the word (meaning). We therefore argue that such a proposition and its articulation with the concepts of meaning in psychological activity are fundamental to understanding intellectual disability, bringing practical and therapeutic implications for developmental psychology.