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October 1, 2025Deleted JournalOpen Access

Expressivists Beware—Moral Judgments Do Not Aim at a Deflationary Truth

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Authors

RVRodrigo Valencia-Pacheco

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Overview

This article critiques the view that expressivist moral judgments can align with belief-like attitudes, suggesting limitations in explaining their truth norms.

Key Points

  • Moral judgments involve belief-like properties, complicating the expressivist view of them as mere desires.
  • Brown's interpretationist account posits that expressivists can frame moral judgments as non-representational beliefs.
  • This perspective, while promising, fails to explain the norm governing moral beliefs to aim at truth.
  • Deflationary views of truth do not satisfactorily resolve the tensions inherent in expressivist moral judgments.

Cite This Study

Rodrigo Valencia-Pacheco (2025) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/68dd9537fe798ba2fc4997b9https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v740.3093
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