Abstract There is widespread consensus in peace research that territorial conflicts are more enduring and difficult to settle than non-territorial conflicts. However, theoretical explanations for this relationship vary. We apply a new conceptual framework to integrate existing explanations into a broader theory. We highlight how earlier work suggests alternative mechanisms: either actors in territorial intra-state conflicts are less willing to compromise at the negotiation table, or the most relevant negotiation issues on the table in territorial conflicts are particularly difficult. This theoretical argument directly translates into a statistical model, enabling us to measure and compare the latent compromise propensity and the relative difficulty of negotiated provisions in territorial versus non-territorial conflicts. In a preregistered analysis, we find that comprehensive peace agreements are less likely in territorial civil wars because provisions primarily relevant in territorial conflicts are particularly difficult. Further analyses show that territorial conflicts also have a lower overall compromise propensity than government conflicts, but specific context characteristics in territorial conflicts explain this difference.
Dankenbring et al. (Thu,) studied this question.