Pathways for Overcoming Commitment Problems in the Transition from Intrastate Conflict to Peace: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

This article examines why some intrastate conflicts that end with comprehensive peace agreements lead to lasting peace, while others relapse into conflict. It focuses on the design and implementation of civil war peace agreements by formally evaluating a theoretical framework grounded in the bargaining model of war and credible commitment mechanisms. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, the study explores the conditions that facilitate successful transitions from war to peace. Five explanatory conditions are identified: power-sharing, transitional justice, transitional reform, international assistance, and the implementation process. The analysis compares thirty-four peace agreement cases between 1989 and 2012, drawing on data from numerous sources. The findings underscore the significance of fear-reducing, cost-increasing, and confidence-building mechanisms, suggesting the need to reassess existing theoretical frameworks. The study also compares five typical and three individually irrelevant cases to test the properties that link specific sufficient configurations to the outcome.