Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
A regulator who designs a public stress test to elicit private investment in a distressed bank must account for large investors' private information on the bank's state. We provide conditions for crowding-in (crowding-out) so that the regulator offers more (less) information to better-informed investors. Crowding-in obtains if investors' private information is not too discriminating of the state. We show that the region of the common prior is consequential: if crowding-in occurs for ex-ante optimistic investors then crowding-out follows if they were instead pessimistic. Investors' value from more precise private signals may come from the effect on the public test's precision.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Alonso et al. (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: