In this article, I explore the moral significance of human interiority, examining how one's inner life has moral import vis-à-vis external, observable, or public behaviour. Contrary to views that problematize interiority or introspection, pitting them against truthful self-understanding, sociality, or public moral behaviour, I will draw on Augustine and Iris Murdoch as resources for reconsidering interiority's role in moral growth. First, I will show how both depict objective, ‘public’ moral behaviour as being fundamentally contingent upon subjective, ‘personal’ judgement, deliberation, and reflection. Then, I will consider three overlapping areas of interest regarding subjectivity in Augustine and Murdoch: self-examination, humility, and love. In drawing on Augustine and Murdoch as resources for an enriched account of interiority vis-à-vis moral growth, I hope to reaffirm the significance of subjectivity for ‘public’, objective moral behaviour while re-examining settled, conventional characterisations of subjectivity and objectivity by suggesting that our perspectives and responses to questions concerning the good are irreducibly and inextricably personal.
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Abraham S‐C Wu (2024) studied this question.
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