Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This article provides evidence on the impact of political incentives on the environment using the case of China’s pollution during 1993–2010. Exploring variation in governors’ connections with key officials in the center, I document that gaining connections increases pollution (measured by satellite and official data). I also find that connected governors increase coal-fired power production more when less precipitation makes it more difficult to rely on hydropower. These results highlight the importance that career incentives play in influencing environmental outcomes, and they propose a potential pathway for mitigating environmental challenges through the recalibration of political incentives. (JEL D74, H11, Q53).
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Ruixue Jia (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: