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Political incentives yield considerable influence over officials' decision‐making, often prompting a focus on short‐term gains at the expense of long‐term outcomes. This paper employs the context of the Chinese GDP ranking competition to investigate the potential risks associated with political incentive systems. Exploiting regression discontinuity designs based on the exact change in GDP ranking, we demonstrate a significant causal relationship between GDP ranking and air pollution measured by fine particles (PM2.5) concentration. Our findings reveal that cities experiencing a decline in GDP ranking are followed by significantly higher PM2.5 concentrations compared to those without a decline in ranking. We extend our analysis to the provincial quarterly level and find similar results. However, the impact on air quality is short‐lived, diminishing after the first year. Further evidence suggests that the pollution effects associated with GDP ranking pressure exhibit within‐year temporal variation. Specifically, the effects are more pronounced in February, November and December, periods that coincide with important stages of annual economic evaluation cycles. This concentrated effort to improve rankings results in adverse environmental consequences. Mechanism analysis reveals that officials in cities with declining GDP rankings respond by increasing fixed asset investments, promoting industrial enterprise registrations, and potentially weaken environmental enforcement, thereby intensifying economic activities that contribute to air pollution.
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Ma et al. (2026) studied this question.
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