This article surveys how neorepublicanism can address a recent criticism: that it fails to identify and redress structural forms of domination (i.e., not easily traceable to dominating agents). I argue that neorepublican 'basic liberties' may outline policy responses to what critics consider structural domination. Then I examine the neorepublican account of social structure as an incidental facilitator of domination, offering two interpretations: as 'structurally produced agent-level domination,' and as 'structural risk of agent-level domination.' I conclude that, when it comes to dealing with structural domination, neorepublicans fall into the same presumption against state interference they hold against liberals and libertarians.
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David Guerrero (2024) studied this question.
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