Against decent domination: A neo-republican critique of Rawls’s Law of Peoples

John Rawls’s Law of Peoples introduces “decent hierarchical peoples” as non-liberal societies that may nevertheless be recognized as members in good standing of the Society of Peoples if they protect basic human rights and refrain from aggression. I argue that Rawls’s account of decency remains normatively insufficient when assessed through neo-republican freedom as non-domination. Although decent hierarchies may avoid systematic interference, they may still authorize durable asymmetries of power that leave non-dominant persons dependent on the discretionary will of dominant groups. By distinguishing non-interference from non-domination, I show why consultation, public justification, and minimal rights protection do not necessarily secure persons against arbitrary power. I also distinguish my argument from existing liberal and cosmopolitan criticisms of Rawls; my objection is not that decent peoples must be coerced into liberalism, but that toleration should not imply passivity toward domination. I therefore propose non-coercive strategies, centered on exit and voice, through which liberal peoples may help reduce domination while preserving international equality, pluralism, and Rawlsian constraints on coercive intervention.