Reclaiming temporal Being : Worlding, non-finality, and the pluriverse

Pluriversal thought challenges institutions that treat one account of reality as universally binding. It shows that worlds are materially enacted, relationally constituted, and historically entangled rather than interpretations of a neutral reality. Yet the language of ontological plurality can blur three distinct claims: commitments about what exists, practices that enact consequential realities, and the existence of self-grounding ontological domains. This article argues that the first two do not entail the third. Distinguishing Being from beings and worlding from worlds, it understands Being as the non-possessable condition of worlding that no disclosure can exhaust, and worlds as historical formations sustained and transformed through practice. Temporal Being explains how worlds endure without becoming complete and how their histories may be spatialised as fixed cosmological locations. Politically, this non-finality redirects attention to ontological closure: the unequal process through which a situated account acquires binding authority and organises reality for others.