Combined performances of platform retailer's store brand and competing manufacturers' distribution contracts

The rapid development of e-commerce platforms leads many competing manufacturers to sell asymmetrical quality national brands (NBs) via a common platform retailer (p-retailer) with agency-selling contract or reselling contract. Meanwhile, some p-retailers introduce store brands (SBs) to further improve profitability. We use the game-theoretic models to examine the combined performances of SB introduction and distribution contract in a co-opetition supply chain with a high-quality NB (HNB) manufacturer, a low-quality NB (LNB) manufacturer, and a p-retailer through considering SB spillover. Results indicate that the p-retailer always benefits from introducing SB when the LNB manufacturer uses reselling contract regardless of the HNB manufacturer's distribution contract, but when the LNB manufacturer uses agency-selling contract, whether the p-retailer benefits from introducing SB depends on the HNB manufacturer's distribution contract and certain market conditions. Additionally, SB introduction does not alter each manufacturer's optimal distribution contract choice. Interestingly, the HNB manufacturer cannot always gain a higher performance than the LNB manufacturer.