This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.
The rapid growth of store brands (SBs) introduced by e-commerce platforms (EPs) has significantly reshaped the retail industry. In response to the intensifying competition between NBs and SBs, it has become a critical strategic decision for national brand (NB) manufacturers to selecting an optimal sales channel, such as reselling or agency selling. This study examines the selling channel strategy choices of NB manufacturers within the context of a platform supply chain, which includes a dominant EP and an NB manufacturer. By developing a game theory model, we analyse which sales mode the NB manufacturer should adopt to maximise their benefits and explore how SBs impact the manufacturer's decisions and profits. Our analysis reveals that when the EP's agency fee rate is sufficiently low, the reduction in sales costs and the avoidance of double marginalisation make the agency selling model more attractive for NB manufacturers. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that NB manufacturers may opt for the agency selling model to mitigate competition from SBs, even in cases where the EP agency fee rate is high and SB production costs are relatively low. In contrast, when SB production costs are high, the reselling model generally yields higher profitability for the NB manufacturer. Furthermore, we demonstrate that when consumer preference for SBs is low, introducing SBs can increase profits for all members of the supply chain, resulting in a Pareto improvement. Finally, our results remain robust when accounting for demand uncertainty.
Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Yu et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: