How can the Government Promote Sustainable Cooperation between Schools and Enterprises? A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Study

Facilitating sustainable cooperation between schools and enterprises has become an important concern in many countries. However, there remains a gap in understanding the approaches taken by central and local governments to foster such cooperation through the lens of evolutionary game theory. Therefore, this paper aims to develop a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving schools, enterprises, the central government, and local governments, to analyze the conditions under which governments can effectively promote school-enterprise cooperation. Our findings indicate that benefit is a decisive factor that affects the strategies of all parties. When the benefits of cooperation are sufficiently attractive, schools and enterprises are inclined to cooperate with each other independently of governmental intervention. While increasing incentives and penalties from the central government and local governments can stimulate school-enterprise cooperation, these measures are not sustainable in the long term. Additionally, the impact of the central government’s incentives and penalties on local governments in promoting school-enterprise cooperation is limited. Enhancing policy efficacy and the practical outcomes of school-enterprise cooperation is essential, which not only strengthens the bond between schools and enterprises but also ensures deep and enduring governmental involvement.