On Disclosedness as the Primordial Phenomenon of Truth in Heidegger

This article aims to revive and evaluate a relatively recent epistemological debate focused on Heidegger’s primordial truth, specifically delving into the 44th section of Being and Time. Unfolding in five parts, the first establishes Heidegger’s conception of truth, paving the way for a nuanced exploration of the ensuing discourse. Part two outlines the foundations of Tugendhat’s criticisms, providing a critical lens for scrutinizing Heidegger’s framework. The third and fourth sections articulate substantial criticisms, centering on the legitimacy of defining disclosedness as the most primordial truth within Heidegger’s framework. Tugendhat’s contentions are met with Dahlstrom’s defense, countering claims by presenting alternative interpretations and highlighting the inherent errancy in human disclosedness. The final and fifth section advocates for Tugendhat’s perspective, comparing Heidegger’s position with pragmatist philosophers. The conclusion suggests that Tugendhat’s claims persist either disregarded or inadequately addressed, leaving the criticisms unanswered. Notably, a comprehensive resolution seems elusive without resorting to hermeneutic violence against Heidegger’s texts.