Kant and the Moral Need to Limit Theoretical Reason: An Expansion of Hare's Concept of Rational Instability

Why does Kant reject atheism in such strong terms despite his denial of the traditional proofs for the existence of God? I take the position that the question of atheism and the problem it entails are not a side issue but the recurring portrait of a figure that haunts Kant not just in the Religion, but throughout his critical philosophy. I seek to expand what Kant criticizes in atheism or, more accurately, to identify atheism as part of a collection of positions that Kant rejects on grounds of what John Hare calls “rational instability,” which is ultimately a moral-rational instability. This includes also certain forms of theism and theological beliefs. I claim that Kant's agenda is to construct a world view in which genuine moral behaviour is possible by preserving the world as a moral space in which individuals are free to be moral, and that the target of his metaphysical criticism is those who over-explain the world so as to deny the possibility of a meaningful self-consciousness of agency.