Australia's "Taiwan Problem":Middle-Power Agency and the Self-Centeredness of the Australian National Debate Peter Dean (bio) Australia has a Taiwan problem. It needs to be acknowledged and discussed—coolly, calmly, and rationally. But it is not the problem that international observers might expect. It does not concern how Australia contributes to regional security, a regional balance of power, or the cross-strait status quo. For most Australian policy elites, foreign policy journalists, commentators (especially on the far left but not exclusively so), and even the broader public, Australia's "Taiwan problem" centers on the question of whether Canberra would support the United States in a war with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over Taiwan. This is a potential strategic dilemma worthy of deep consideration and debate, but it is not "the problem" in relation to Taiwan that Australia should be exclusively focused on. Rather, there is a fundamental problem with the Australian national debate on this subject. Taiwan as a security dilemma has largely become a reductionist debate in Australian public discourse—rarely, if ever, moving beyond the question of whether to blindly support the United States in the event of conflict and almost always within the context of preserving U.S. primacy in Asia. The debate is almost exclusively focused on this one narrow, hypothetical scenario, which is discussed by journalists, academics, and think-tank commentators such as Hugh White and Sam Roggeveen; former politicians such as Paul Keating and Bob Carr; and far-left commentators and blogs.1 Such an approach is highly problematic for several reasons. First, it completely disenfranchises the Taiwanese people. Second, it removes any sense that an invasion of Taiwan would most likely be a unilateral act by the PRC to change the status quo through the use of force. Third, it reduces [End Page 29] regional security to a bipolar PRC-U.S. struggle in which Australia and other states are mere adjuncts to U.S. power, removing Australian agency. Fourth, it belittles the role of regional multilateral and minilateral security architecture and ignores the agency of other major regional powers—in some cases U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In other words, this debate reduces one of the most important regional security flashpoints to a binary discussion that focuses on Australia's support, or lack of support, for the United States. This national conversation is far removed from Australia's declared strategic approach of a regional balancing strategy enabled through allies and partners, deterrence by denial, and the maintenance of the status quo over Taiwan.2 The "Debate" A few examples from contemporary discussions and historical highlights are illustrative of this narrow focus on whether Canberra would support the United States in a war against China over Taiwan. In Richard Marles's first appearance as deputy prime minister and defense minister on 7:30, the headline current affairs program of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the first question was on China and the second on whether Australia would support the United States in the event of a Taiwan conflict.3 During the exchange, journalist Sarah Ferguson interjected no less than three times in search of a "gotcha" moment from Marles regarding President Joe Biden's statements in 2023 on the defense of Taiwan and U.S. policy. Although she was not successful, it is illustrative that her questions about Taiwan never progressed beyond this point. Eight months later, Foreign Minister Penny Wong gave arguably the most significant speech on the nation's Indo-Pacific regional security policy by an Australian government minister in the past decade. Previewing the Defence Strategic Review, released one week later, Minister Wong articulated Australia's approach to the region. On Taiwan, she stated: [End Page 30] Let me be absolutely clear. A war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for all. We know that there would be no real winners, and we know maintaining the status quo is comprehensively superior to any alternative. It will be challenging, requiring both reassurance and deterrence, but it is the proposition most capable of averting conflict and enabling the region to live in peace and...
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Peter B. Dean (2024) studied this question.
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