Phenomenology and Lived Phases of Perceived Time

The paper represents an analysis of the concept for reflection in the context of Husserl's idea of the absolute flux of consciousness and phenomenological concept of time as a whole. In the first place, the goal here is to isolate the core of Husserl's understanding of subjectivity as the interconnection of different levels of temporariness. In the second place, the paper contributes to the correlation of the general premises of phenomenological method with the concrete intentional analysis, and thirdly – to specifically show the basic contradictions in regard to phenomenology: the reflection as a basis of the phenomenological method, which proclaimed "motion to objects themselves", there is, actually, a motion from the objects, because turning to the reflection is a rotation from the objective space and time, from the objective being of nature as a whole, from the objective practical and social activity to the subjectivity as their sole actual basis.