This paper challenges the dominant representationalist paradigm in the philosophy of mind by developing a process-monistic, anti-representationalist account of cognition. It argues that the persistent mind-body problem is a consequence of a flawed substance ontology and the representationalist framework it necessitates. To overcome this, the paper constructs a critical synthesis of three influential anti-representationalist strands: Robert Brandom’s linguistic inferentialism as a “top-down” approach, the embodied and enactive theory of mind as a “bottom-up” approach, and the Resonance-Inference Model (RIM) as a unifying scientific framework. Drawing on Schopenhauer’s revolutionary turn to the lived body (Leib) as a non-representational access to reality, the paper traces a continuous path from basic biological normativity to the complex social normativity of human reason. By reinterpreting the Free Energy Principle (FEP) through an enactive lens (“enactive inference”) and employing the concept of formal downward causation from synergetics, the RIM provides a scientifically grounded mechanism for mental causation without resorting to dualism or reductionism. The resulting framework offers an integrated, multi-scale description of the mind as an embodied, self-organizing process, with significant implications for understanding psychopathology and critiquing contemporary rationalist theories.
Gerd Leidig (Thu,) studied this question.