Preventing conflicts of interest in the civil service is a fundamental element of national and international anti-corruption strategies. Despite the formal adoption of legal frameworks in many countries, enforcement mechanisms often lack clarity, consistency, and institutional independence. This study examines the effectiveness of legal instruments designed to prevent conflicts of interest across a comparative set of jurisdictions, including EU Member States, the USA, Ukraine, Georgia, India, and Kenya. The research employs a multidimensional legal methodology combining comparative legal analysis, judicial case review, expert interviews, and legal forecasting to assess not only the content of laws but their application in practice. The results demonstrate that jurisdictions with clear legal definitions, autonomous oversight bodies, and judicial enforcement capacity such as France, Germany, Italy, and the United States show significantly higher levels of compliance and deterrence. In contrast, countries with vague legal terminology and politicized institutions struggle to operationalize existing laws, resulting in a disconnect between formal legal frameworks and their practical impact. Scientific novelty lies in the integration of doctrinal legal analysis with empirical validation, offering a rare triangulated view of law-in-action in the domain of public sector ethics. The study also introduces the legal forecasting method to evaluate future compliance risks and to develop reform scenarios based on institutional capacity. The findings support the conclusion that effective prevention of conflicts of interest depends not solely on the presence of legislation but on the synergy between legal precision, institutional autonomy, and public accountability. The research offers concrete recommendations for legal reform, enforcement practice, and international harmonization. Future research should explore the integration of digital governance tools and artificial intelligence in conflict-of-interest detection and policy implementation.
Tellis et al. (Fri,) studied this question.