Optimal Incentive Mechanism: Balancing the Complex Risk Preferences of Shared Battery Swapping Station Enterprises Under Dual Asymmetric Information

This study investigates how the government can design optimal incentive mechanisms for Shared Battery Swapping Station (SBSS) construction enterprises under the conditions of dual information asymmetry (effort and operational efficiency) and heterogeneous corporate risk preferences. Employing game theory and principal–agent theory, this research constructs a mathematical model between the government and the enterprises to derive the optimal incentive coefficient and fixed subsidy, with theoretical results verified through numerical simulations. The findings reveal that risk-averse enterprises require higher incentives and subsidies. Compared to a single asymmetry scenario, the incentive coefficient is lower under dual information asymmetry. The government’s utility increases with an enterprise’s risk aversion beyond a critical threshold, while the enterprise’s utility remains at its reservation level. Our findings reveal a critical trade-off: while risk-averse enterprises require higher fixed subsidies and incentive coefficients, the presence of dual information asymmetry forces the government to paradoxically lower the incentive coefficient to prevent information rent extraction by less efficient firms. Furthermore, we identify a critical threshold where it becomes more beneficial for the government to contract with highly risk-averse firms due to their predictable behavior, even as the enterprise’s utility is held at its reservation level. These results provide a quantitative basis for policymakers to design a ’menu of contracts’—offering stable, high-subsidy options for risk-averse players and performance-based incentives for risk-neutral ones—rather than a one-size-fits-all policy.