Dai Zhen reinterprets human nature and morality, suggesting moral goodness arises from human relationships and societal contexts.
This paper discusses Dai Zhen’s 戴震 (1724–1777) interpretation of human nature against the backdrop of Mencius’s claim that human nature is good. I argue that Dai Zhen ingeniously reinterprets the “shan” 善 (good; goodness) in terms of “fen” 分 (allotments; distinction) to view the claimed “goodness” as the unique and finest physical makeup of human nature that possesses the potential ability to know moral goodness, viz. liyi 理義 (principle & righteousness). Nonetheless, rather than a transcendental principle or some heavenly endowed virtue, liyi is present in human relationships and everyday life. At the crux of the issue is how to activate the given ability and advance our intelligent mind for principle and righteousness. By ridding “xingshan” 性善 (human nature is good) of its inherent moral properties as Mencius posits in his theory of human nature, Dai Zhen, from a naturalistic and empirical stance, proposes an unconventional approach to the longstanding debate over whether human nature is good or evil in Confucian discourse. While his interpretation may unsettle us that are accustomed to the traditional view of the “goodness” of human nature as one’s innate moral feelings of ren yi li zhi 仁義禮智 (benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety), Dai Zhen’s reading has undoubtedly thrown a new light on this famed Mencian thesis.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Fei Lan (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: